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CHAPTER I
A SURVET OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OP THE EAST
CENTRAL STATE OF NIGERIA
Introduction—East Central State was created out of the former
Eastern Region of Nigeria in May^ 1967* It stretches from the Idoma and
Tiv country in the north almost to the swamp area in the south and east
to west from the Niger to the Cross River with a population of 7*2
million.
The circujastances surrounding the creation of the state are more
politically motivated than economical. Prior to May^ 1967« Nigeria was
divided into four regions-northem region^ western region^ mid-west region
and eastern region. Within each region there was a dominant tribe and
some minority grot^s. The Housa tribe dominated the northern region, the
Yoruba tribe dominated the western region and the Ibos dominated the
eastern and mid-western regions. For many years, there has been agita¬
tion by minority groi^ps throughout Nigeria for some form of separate
government, to take their populations away from the domination of the
massive tribes in their regions. After the Military Government was set
up, general feeling changed and the ad hoc conferences and meetings of
prominent people in the regions recommended the creation of new units or
regions. This was not accepted in the east. They did not lose sight of
the fact that out of the total of 12.3 million people in the eastern
region, 5.1 million belonged to the minority group, (now known as the
River State and the South Eastern State), which had long been pressing
for a change. Despite Colonel Ojukwu's (Military Governor of the Eastern
1
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Region) refiisal and insistence on the continuance of the region as it
stood) General Gowon (present Head of State in Nigeria) decided to go
ahead) with the approval of the Si;^raae Military Council (less Colonel
Ojukwu)) and a Decree of the 27th Maj) 1967, announced that the country
would henceforth be split into twelve states.
Questions have been asked on several aspects of the creation of the
states. "The obvious difficuli^ was once separation started) where would
it stop? There is a limit to the viability) as it is now called) of
small Tinits-that IS) can they pay their way) can they raise enough money
locally to pay for the expensive paraphemalia of government and the
necessary senior administrative staff) can they indeed find locally men
of the right calibre to fill the posts in the service and to serve in
1
the legislature and the like.”
There are no immediate answers to these qxiestlons. Economically a
breakup woxild halt the progress of industrialization which had advanced
rapidly because Nigeria offers the biggest single market in Africa. In
some cases it might mean the shutting down of industries sincer whatever
the original intentions of the new stateS) they would undoubtedly erect
customs barriers against each other. The mov^ent of food from one part
of Nigeria to another) on which millions depend for their daily needS)
would become more difficult and more expansive. Each state would fall
back on the abilities of its own citizens alone and could not draw on the
pool of Nigerian talent. Each would have to pay for her own external
1
Sir Rex Niven) The War of N^erlan Unity 1967-1970 (New Jersey:
Rowan and Littlefield) 197l)> p* ^4.
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representation and defense. For the ordinazy citizens the breakdoim
would soon ccme to mean much higher taxes^ more unonployment^ and high
living costs. For the Eastern region in particular breakup would be
disastrous because of the millions of its citizens who thrive elsetdzere
in KLgerla. Large area of the region represent the most thickly populated
parts of Africa outside the Niger Vall^^ and the land could not possibly
sustain all who returned.
The Secession—Among other things, the creation of the East Central
State spurred Colonel Ojukvm to declare the former Eastern region as a
whole to be a sovereign independent state on the 30th May, 196? tinder the
new name of the Republic of Biafra. The secession was not just an emotional
issue. It had behind it hard economic reality. "The oil industry much
of it located within the Eastern Nigeria or off its shores, had con^letely
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changed the economic prospects of the East." For years the East had been
the poorest of the regions, lacking resources, and having the highest
density population for which to come. It had been forced to look for
subsidies not always easy to spot in the accounts.
The secession triggered the Nlgeria-Biafra War in 1967. The Mlitary
Government applied various economic pressure on the government of Biafra
to bring her to her knees. There was a ban on aircraft to Eastern airports,
the declaration that Eastern ports were no longer customs areas, the ban
on foreign currency transaction with the Eastern Regional Government and
its agencies, the restrictions on money transferes through post offices
_
John Oyinbo, Nigeria: Crisis and Beyond (London: Charles Knight
and Co., Ltd., 1971), p. 78.
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and re-assertion of the statutory monopoly of the Nigerian Produce
Marketing Company to sell produce abroad. Telephone, telex and postal
communications between the East and the rest of the country were ceased.
Shipping to the Eastern Ports of Port Hancourt, Bonny, Degema, Abonema
and Calabar was stopped and shipping lines were warned not to enter
Nigerian terrltoriillwaters off the Eastern Coast. Central Bank controls
of foreign exchange transactions from the East were tightened with a
number of measures idilch included a ban on the inport and export of
currency notes to and from the East. Controls were placed on physical
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movmaents, particularly in relation to motor traffic over the Niger Bridge.
As a result of the sanctions, communications between commercial
firms operating in the East and other parts of the federations were cut
off. Trade between the Eastern states and the Mid-¥est in particular was
affected, due to the control on the Niger Bridge. This trade was two-way,
and the most immediate effects were shortages of food in the East,
industries in the Eastern states which depend on markets or raw materials
elsewhere in the federation were affected. The ban on shipping to and
from Eastern ports had the most serious econonic consequences. Port
Hancourt traditionally carries by few the largest proportion of the import-
export trade from and to the Eastern group of states and it was the
cessation of this trade idiich had serious consequences. Excluding oil,
the most important source of foreign exchange for the East is the export
of palm products. The blockade stopped this and also many essential imports.
-
The Niger Bridge serves as the link between the Eastern Nigeria and
the Mid-West.
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It could be mentioned here the importance of oil in the gamble for
secession. Holding the loyalty of the minority people and thus gaining
the oil wealth which lay under the land and along the shores would have
been a great asset to Biafra. The economic war was centered in skirmishes
concerning the payment of overdue oil royalties. Oil had become an
important source of revenue and an earner of foreign exchange Just before
the war. Vdth the refinery cut off and the HLd-West installations hindered
in their operations the Federal Government had to sanction the import of
petroleum prodiicts at the cost of foreign exchaxige. It also suffered the
loss of overall oil revenues.
Biafra co\ild not survive the economic blockade which made defeat
inevitable. The blockade^ which was effective by sea and land, except
for frontlines trading between the armies and some gaps through the Mid-
West and from the Noirbh down the Anambra Valley, not only kept out
supplies of arms, ammunition and essential machinery, but prevented the
export of oil and palm products which might have earned some foreign
exchange. The war finally ended in January, 1970, and the Biafrans had
no choice but to accept the creation and existence of the East Central
State. Now the people of the East Central State are faced with the problem
of rehabilitation axid economic development.
The People of :E»C.:Sr-The cultural aspect of economic develoimient of
the East Central State is manifested by a brief discussion on the
inhabitants of the state. They are known as the Ibos.
6
"The Ibo men are the hardest workers In Nigeria,
and their women among the most charming and the
most Intelligent. They are neither mentally nor
physically lazy, and have shown themselves to have
IQs as high as any race or group any where in the
world.... ”1^
Robert CoUis stated that, realizing the value of education, the
Ibos acquired the modem way of doing things quicker than any other
people in Nigeria. Thsy sre very profilic and once modern scientific
medicine began to reduce the death rate it became impossible for so
small and relatively bare area to support such a growing population and
they had to emigrate outside their own region. As a result, the Ibos
sprang up all over Nigeria. He also stated that the Ibos...usually
obtained excellent jobs because they had taken more trouble than members
of the other tribes to get educated and find out about modem technology.
The Ibos are the most clannish of the Nigerian people. Indeed it was a
general finding among the expatriates that if you took on an Ibo steward,
you would find, soon, that all your other servants were Ibos too. The
accuracy of Mr. Collis's account is undlsputable, and the role of the
socio-cultural environment of the Ibos in the economic development of
East Central State would be e^lored further in later chapters.
Rehabilitation and Resettlement^-The immediate problems presented b7
the Biafran collapse and the end of the civil war in January, 1970 were
enough to daunt any administration. The processes of rehabilitation and
resettlement contain a crucial even if less tangible soclo-psychological
dimension. They involve not merely the restoration of the capacity for
—u
Robert CoUis, Nigeria in Conflict (London: Seeker and Warburg,
1970), p. 79.
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economic well-being to persons, the restoration of destroyed or disrupted
materials and services, but is the circumstances of a civil war, they
also include the need to reassure the people that thsy do in fact have a
future* Hr. Ulpabl Aslka, the administrator of the East Central State,
announced a provisional figure of hUOO million (one Nigerian pound ih)=
2.U0 U.S. dollars) as the possible cost of rehabilitating areas affected
• 5
the civil war. This figure covered reconstruction of roads, provision
of basic utilities like electricity and water, repair of buildings and
the construction for scnae form of low-cost housing to provide accommoda¬
tions for the homeless, the capital cost of restoring social services such
as education. The Federal Government could not meet external e^enditure
from its own internal resources without external help. If aid was sought
it should be in the form either of grants or interest-free loans. In his
lecture, Mr. Asika urged that the external aid for rehabilitation be
treated as a "special category." The question is not whether the construction
of one house in a village or town to privide accommodation for the homeless
is likely to generate enough economic life and activity to justify external
financial assistance. The fact is that although expenditure of this
nature may not result directly in immediate financial returns it could
indirectly create the conditions for stability which in turn enhances
economic growth. Thus he said, "We must accept the fact that if we are
to undertake rehabilitation at a fairly quick pace to ensure early return
of normalcy, we still require a large proportion of foreign finance on
5
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The East Central State could never have employed all the Ibos eam;)lo7ed
the former Eastern region. The inhabitants of the war-affected areas
vary from fanners and traders who are self-supporting, to civil servants
and employees of factories and mercantile establishments. The war has
resulted in most factories being dormant whilst farmers have deserted
their farms, traders their wares and civil servants their offices. Due
to the availability of resowces, limitation is imposed on employment.
Employment based merely on the need to resettle a man without reference
to the contribution to total output amount, amounts to sheer waste of
resources. Employment must be related to the contribution of the employee
to the total output and to this extent has a functional relationship with
the additional input to generate economic production in other sections of
the economy. Public works shoxild soon not only assist to revive the
economy, but should provide Jobs.
The loss of schooling, in some cases for two years as a result of the
war, is one of the most serious problems of large areas of the former
Eastern region. This was the region where the greatest premium was placed
on education. There was the question of how the loss of these years was
to be made good. There could be no lowering of standards, since certificates
issued ai^here in the federation must be of equal value anywhere else.
Was it wise to insist on a uniform age for pupils to enter secondary schools
or colleges? Mr. Asika argued that if a settlement was to be based on the




for those who had lost periods of education in East Central State. If
the uniform age for entry for secondary schools and colleges was insisted
on, these children would be denied this equality. Private efforts wotild
be ltq>ortant and night even enable some children to reach universities.
But iinless the problem was properly tackled many would end having to
take menial jobs, such as farming, which is ”the hard core of a dlsgmntled
and dissatlfied group.
Rehabilitation of different categories of people poses different
problems. The salaried and wage>eamlng classes form about three to five
percent of the total population. Their rehabilitation would almost be
straight forward when the econony, both public and private, was once again
able to employ them. The real problem would be that vast nuid>er, which
Mr. Aslka estimates at about twenty-five percent of the population, who
were not engaged in wage-earning, but were self-employed; small fabricators,
artisans, traders, merchants, transport operators, tailors, etc. Short¬
term expedients might help, but the only real answer was complete restora¬
tion of the economy.
The administrator stated that, what is needed with regard to
rehabilitation involves not merely the restoration of buildings, materials
and services, but also the regeneration and re-development of the productive
capacities of the affected area to a level capable of generating adequate
income and employment to sustain the auLintenance and reproduction of the
population to meet the recurrent cost of the restored facilities and to
continue forward development of the area. Recovery in the towns was bound
to take longer and urban living is in Itself more structurally complicated
10
than rural.
There is greater need for civil administration and public services.
"The struggle among officials in the East Central State, for office, for
preferment, for qaa3rbers, for privileges is one of the great obstacles to
7
recovery."
By the end of the war, there were federal troops spending freely and
the army had been followed by traders from Lagos and the NorUi with food
and goods for sale. Currency soon became the issue of immediate
resettlement. Only the federal coinage, of which there was an acute
shortage, was acceptable on all sides. The redemption of Biafran or old
Nigerian currency would enrich speculators. The federal decision not to
redeaa these currencies, and to make uniform "ex-gratia payments" to small
number of people who lodged notes for redmqption was welcomed by Hie East
Central State Government. Desperately short of money, the state authorities
must also have warmly welcomed the Federal Government's decision that the
state government itself should receive, to spend on rehabilitation, the
bulk of the mon^ which it is presumed, was being held in Lagos for possible
currency redemption. This amounting to some hlO million (a sum greater
than the federally collected revenue of some i8-3/U million, which accounts
for the bulk of the state's normal revenue in 1970-71), with the hi; million
given to people who had kept lodged currency, should help to get the
economy of the state into working order.
7
Editorial, "Rebuilding at Enugu," West Africa (No. 2766, June 13, 1970),
front page.
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The ptirpose of this writing is to survey the econoiny of the East
Central State since its creation. How has the war affected the econony?
Would it be able to recover? What set of policies woxild be adequate for
the effective control of the econony? What bearing the state's econoiny
has or had on the Nigerian econony as a whole?
Since this is a new state, there are not many books published on the
subject matter. Sources of Information are very limited, but to some
extent, periodicals and lectures fill in the gap. The East Central State
harbors the bulk of government activities in the former Eastern region*
Therefore, the economic development plan of the former region could be
put into force in the East Central State with only slight alteration. By
using the Economic Flan for the region in 196U~66, a vivid economic future
of the state would come into focus.
CHAPTER II
AGRICULTURAL AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT
More than 75 percent of the 7.2 million of the inhabitants of East
Central State depend on agriciilture for their livelihood. Since
agriculture plays a crucial role in the early stages of economic develop¬
ment by providing food to meet the needs of an increasing population,
raw materials for industries, e:i{port earnings to finance imports and to
provide needed foreign exchange and an avenue for the absorption of an
additional agricultural working population, the East Central government
gave improvement in agricultural productivity a greater priority.
Distribution of Population—It will be appropriate to discuss at this
tine the effect of population distribution on the agricultural productivity
in the East Central State. Before the crises which started in 1966 the
population of the area of the former Eastern Nigeria was very unevenly
distributed, with the major contrast being between the very heavily
populated Ibo-speaking (East Central) and Ansxig areas and the rest of the
;i:egi0n. In certain Ibo areas density population exceeded 2,000 per square
1
mile and occasionally 3,000. But in many non-Ibo areas it was 100.
This uneven distribution is significant in that it corresponds to the
ethnic division. This division according to ethnic and demographic factors
is ftirther complicated by the fact that the areas of high doisity tend to
have sandy lands which are very poor quality and which are already heavily
i
From a Correspondent, "SUOO M. for Post-War Repairs?," West Africa
(London: No. 270$, April $, 1969)> p. 37li.
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exhausted. Non-Ibo areas tended to be far more fertile. }fc>st of the
population of the former Eastern Nigeria lived In 7,500 village communities
which formed the traditional or rural econon^. Out of a population of
12.U million about 70 percent, or 8.7 million, were engaged In agricultural
production, with about 30 percent, or 3*7 million, engaged In non-
2
agrlcultxiral occupations.
The rural economy was stagnant. There was little or no Investment
except In the bullding of private houses by individuals. In the meantime,
there was intensive urban development which Increased significantly the
gap between urban and rural conditions and thus contributed to a decline
of the rural economy before the crisis. Rural handicrafts (weaving, pottery,
foundry and smlthery), were replaced by imported goods. Also during the
same period, an archaic ^stem of land tenure res\ilted in hopeless
fragmentation in densely populated areas. From this high population and
smaller agricultural holdings had developed a pattern of outward movement
and migration to other parts of Nigeria, to Cameroon, Ghana, Fernando Po
and the growing tcnms of the Eastern Nigeria Itself. Migrants tended to
stay away for the whole of their active life, but even before 1966
political considerations had begrin to limit migration. Since the war
migration outside Nigeria was virtually lnQ>ossible.
Considerable tensions had developed in Nigeria before 1966 as a
result of migration from the East, although migration Inside the East had
continued strongly, particularly because of rapid urban development and
2
A. Ayida and H. M. Onitiri eds.. Reconstruction and Development in
Nigeria (London: Oxford Press, 1971), p. 629.
the growth of the oil industry.
In addition to these cases of more or less permanent migration into
urban centers or to areas outside the region^ there was also migratozy
adjustment to the ecological and demographic pressures of the rural econony
which may be called regional seasonal migration. Each year hundreds and
thousands of agricultural workers moved from the areas of high density and
low yield to the areas of low density and high yield. There th^ lived
or otherwise temporarily acquired land parcels for the purpose of cultiva¬
tion and at the end of the farming season they departed with their
harvested crops and returned to their own areas. But even this met
difficzxlties before 1966^ aiul such seasonal migration may no longer be
possible. It was the most able-bodied and the most edTicated, idio tended
to migrate^ and ly 1970 war or no war Eastern Nigeria wozild have reached
a crisis caused hy the vast number of unenplcyed school leavers in the
towns. IMderoiployaent was universal in spite of the relative economic
boom. According to Mr. Asika, "the co-existence of conditions of boom
and conditions of stagnation and mass underemployment must have Induced
particularly Intense levels of frustrated expectations. It is to this
already unstable and e^losive region that large repatriated population
3
was destined to return as a result of the crises in 1966."
Aims of Agriculture—In agriculturej the main emphasis is on the rapid
expansion of tree crops. This policy is designed to lead to an early
increase in cash farm Income, government revenues from purchase taxes and
export duties, and Marketing Board profits. Table I represents the
Asika, Op. Git., p. 8.
3
15
planned innrestment in agricult\ire for the year 1962-68. It should be
noted here that the plan was formulated before the civil war. The
object here is to use the table as a source of con^>arison or forecast of
the future economic develoianants in East Central State. It may be assumed
also that, because East Central constitutes nK>re than three quarters of
the former Eastern region, the 1962-68 Development Plan could be applied
to the East Central with only minor adjustments.
TABI£ I




Tree Crops (Primarily for E::q>ort) 22,781:
Other Crops (Primarily for Food) — 2,795
Animal Health and Husbandry 1,910 2,631
Land Use 822 997
Stqpporting Services 15 1,500
Extension Research axid Training....... 3,616 5,7U
Total 30,055 6,363 36,ia8
Source: Federal Ministry of Economic Development, National Development
Plan 1962-1968 (Apapa: Nigerian National Press Ltd., 1963),
P. 213.
Tree Crops—The development of tree crops primarily for export was
to be organized in several directions such as the promotion of the rein¬
forcement of peasant holdings through a planting scheme the Ministry
of Agric\ilture under which assistance is given in cash and in kind* Also
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the Ministiy was to establish farm settloaents and nucleus plantations.
The Ministry schemes were aimed at stimulating the expansion of tree crops
on peasant holdings. The target was to establish 100,000 acres of oil
palm, 150,000 acres of rubber and 75>000 acres of cocoa plantations.
This was to be achieved b7 the provision of seed, stock, fertilize,
pesticides and tools. Incentive payments partly in cash to cQnQ)ensate
farmers in cases where a switch to new crops or a recommended change in
farming methods would lead to a teoq>orar7 loss of income. The government
proposed a total of hll,359,000 (22,718,000 naira) esqpenditure in tree
crops in the 1962-68 develoixnent plan. A sum of hlU,220,000 (28,Uli0,000
U
naira) was proposed for the Ministry schemes.
The idea of a nucleus plantation was developed to provide for the
establishment of viable plantation units to be owned jointly by outside
investers of the state government, each to the extent of Mp to kS percent,
with the balance of the capital and the initial managmnent to be provided
by a mutually acceptable third party. The Industrial and Agricultural
ConQ}any, Ltd., which is jointly owned by the Colonial Development
Corporation and the former East government, was expected to serve as the
third party.
The major eoqports from the tree crops are palm produce idilch
represents about 90 percent by value of the total exports. Improvements
in qtiallty have been brought about mainly bsr mechanized extraction of oil.
There are two kinds of oil. One is in the fibres of the fruit, which is
—u
In January 1, 1973, the Nigerian Government changed the medium of
monetary exchange from pounds to naira, hi = 2 naira.
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extracted locally in the village, and the other lies in the small black
kernel, which Is usually e^rted to Europe as it Is. This is the fine
essential palm oil from which the 'vegetable' oils of the European market
are derived. Other exports include cocoa, copra, bemlsed, ground nuts
(peanuts) and soy beans. Rubber and timber mqjorts have Increased.
Tree crop development schmnes was promoted in the Eastern region
after 196U by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(World Bank). There were attmapts to provide technical advice and small
amounts of capital to encourage small holders in tree crop investment to
replace aging trees or to ■:iq>and their tree crops. Since the end of the
war, the East Central State has been marching along the road to recovery.
By the end of 1971, almost 1,^00 acres of trees were established so that
there is now sufficient plantation grown timber in the state to support a
number of industries such as paper pulp, chipboard, particle board, and
match and pole manufacture.
Amongst other tree crops, the oil palm tree plays an extremely
important role in the peasant sector of the state. It is the source of
domestic food supplies and also the source of an export crop. "For eaq>ort
purposes, oil palm produce is composed of two elements—palm oil which is
extracted from the pericarp of the palm fruit through crushing and palm




G. K. Helleiner, Peasant Agriculture, Government and Economic Growth
in Nigeria (Homewood, Ill.: Ridiard D. Irwin Ihc., N.D.), p. 91.
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TABLE II
EASTEBN NIGERIA: OIL PALM REHABILHATION SCHEME
1962-1966
Acreage
Tear No. of Participants Target Planted
1962 278 2,000 1,728
1963 565 5,000 3,72U
196U 1,225 8,000 10,U80
1965 1,592 1U,000 13,630
1966 2,169 15,000 20,389
TOTAL U,315 M:,000 U9,95l
Source: Elchen and Idedholmj Growth and Development of the Nigerian
Economy (Michigan: Michigan State Ihilversity Press, 1970), p. 270.
Table II further illustrates the importance of oil palm by the increase
in number of participants and the acreage planted with respect to time.
The successful economic scheme in the oil palm within the states would be
accon^lished if the 1962-68 develofmient plan of the former Eastern region
is implemented. The Oil Palm Grove Rehabilitation Scheme (OPRS) was
developed to replant 60,000 acres with new hybrid palms. During the 1962-
68 plan, the then Eastern Nigerian Ministry of Agriculture major agriciiltural
scheme was the Oil Palm Rehabilitation Scheme. It was estimated that the
goal of 60,000 acres would have been surpassed in the first five years of
the plan, but the civil war made it impossible. Changes were made in the
19
KLnlstry of Agriculture and Natural Resources^ and its activities were
handed over to the newly formed Agricultural Development Corporation.
Food Crop—The proposals for the developnent of food crops were mainly
directed towax^s the prcmotion of rice cultivation and rice processing.
The government piroposed some major ways to accosplishing this. Firstly^
the rice cultivation in the Abaka^Ud. area should be extended in terms of
acreage by encouraging the farmers. A proposed new rice mill was expected,
by increasing returns on the crop, to make a significant impression on the
faimiers. Secondly, rice was considered as a major crop for at least one
of the planned Farm Settlements. Thirdly, the plan was for the development
of a major scheme in the Cross River area where land was largely unciiltivated,
and >diere very large acreages were suitable for rice cultivation subject
to the organization of proper drainage and irrigation and the development
of access roads. The importance placed on rice was because of a noticeable
shift from yams to rice in many parts of the state.
In the very densely settled parts of the state (Awka and Qnltsha
Divisions) the local farmers do not produce enoxigh food for subsistence.
Therefore, th^ have to depend on food imports from other parts of the
state. Crops grown in these food deficit areas are the same as for other
paxiis of Iboland, with yams, cassava and maize predominatii^. One of the
main food items which are produced in such food deficit areas as Ogldl and
Nnewi are fruits including oranges, avocado and African pears, pawpaw,
bananas and plantains. These fruits are grown mainly on conpoundlands,
and are in continuous siq}ply all through the year. Housewives, who take
20
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these fruits to Onitsha, usually return with yams and other food itans
to supplement whatever their farms can produce.
An important fruit which has made it possible for dense populations
to survive in other parts of the states, is the oil palm. Unfortunately,
there is very little emphasis to cultivate oil palms in these areas, where
existing trees are already becoming old. A government scheme for
rehabilitating palm groves has been in existence for several years, but
so far it has not made any appreciable impact on the villagers. This
deserves a special attention by the East Central State Government through
the Training Research and Extension projects.
Trading in foodstuffs and manufactured consumer goods contributes a
significant addition to the family income. Women play an active part
both in trading and in farming, but large-scale trade in palm produce and
imported goods, as well as the bulk handling of trade in foodstuffs like
yams and rice, is directed by men.
To rehabilitate farmers after the war, the East Central State Govern¬
ment undertook a surv^ of the areas affected l^y the war. The surv^
revealed about 13,700,000 yam seedlings are req\iired for cxiltivation.
About $8 percent of these yam seedlii^s were obtainable within the state
but the remaining U2 percent were to be found outside. The cost of a yam
seedling is approximately between five pennies to seven pennies, depend¬
ing on the type of yam and point of purchase, bringing to total cost for
supply of yam seedlings to about EU00,000 (800,000 naira). The surv^
g
Onitsha market is the largest and most modem in Nigeria if not in
West Africa.
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also showed that a total of 500>000 tons of maize (corn) and 2^0,000 tons
-HrH-
of okra seeds would be required.
Animal Health and Husbandry—Animal husbandry was aimed to expand
poultry keeping, to increase the home-grown protein content of the popular
diet, to make the state self-sufficient in eggs and meat and to provide
ex:tra income. This would be achieved through the facilities of Regional
Livestock Center, Poultry Center, and Brooder Units. The Livestock Center
was to serve as the main center for sale of cattle, pigs, goats, sheep
and rabbits to farm settlements and individual peasant holdings throughout
the state. The Poultry Center at Abakaliki was to be expanded considerably
to produce a total of 2^0,000 day-old chicks annually. These were to be
sent to twelve Brooder Units where the chicks will be raised to the age
of ten to twelve weeks, when they could be distributed to farmers as layers.
TABLE III
ANIMAL HEALTH AND HUSBANDRY IN MILLIONS OF
NIGERIAN POUNDS 1962-1968
Title Outlay
Regional Livestock Center 300
PoTiltry Center 280
Brooder Units 386
Animal Feed Mill 920
Total 1,886
Source: "National Development Plan, 1962-68, Op. Clt.«" p. l6.
Ayida Onitiri, Reconstruction and Development in Nigeria (Ibadan:
Oxford University Press, 1971), P« U5l»
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The iit$>ortance of the Aniinal Feed Mill is reflected in the table,
where a greater percentage of the total ftmd for Animal Health and
Husbandry would be allocated to the project. The plan was for the Mill
to provide it,000 tons of animal feed annually. Initially, the Ministry
of AgricTilttire would undertake the project but would eventually be
turned over to either individual or co-operative enterprise.
Training, Research and Extension—These projects all represent the
basic services necessary to ijnQ)lanent the expanded program for agricultural
production. Their objective is to train and support extension staff in
emergency programmes. Effectiveness of these programmes depends on how
fast large numbers of adequate extension workers are being trained. The
training would involve both field work and formal training. It was to
consist of a three month's specific course, to be followed by specialized
courses in poultry at Abakaliki and in livestock at Abak Farm Institute.
The Emergency Training Program was to produce 20^0 extension workers
within four years with the intention of increasing the ratio of extension
workers to farmers from one to $000 farmers (1962 ratio) to one extension
workers to every 700 or 800 farmers. There were to be 260 senior technical
staff who would act in the capacity of supervisors of the e:q>anded
agricultural extension program. Livestock training was to be instituted.
This training and the expansion of Veterinary Services, were to turn out
large ntunbers of inoculators, to give existing staff refresher courses,
and to give groups of farmers short courses on specific types of animal
husbandry by training them for a week or two at a time.
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These projects were planned before the war, without much success.
The East Central State Government must stress luplemoitation of these
projects. It is the responsibility of the extension worker to transmit
to the farmers the results of research—such as new varieties of seeds,
the use of new tools and in^)lements, advice on marketing and credit
facilities and to assist the farmers in production planning and forecas¬
ting. The extension worker should become more and more identified with
the farmer in the acttial processes of production.
If the 1962-68 Development Plan is carried out by the East Central
Government, a total of about h^,711>000 (11,U22,000 niara) would be
invested in Agricultural Training, Research and Extension. This would
call for the expansion of the research facilities at Umudike, the training
of about 230 stxidents at the Agricultural School as Assistant Agricultural
Officers. The funds were for the construction of school buildings and
housing, and the purchase of equipment.
Land Use—The former Eastern region allocated £600,000 (1,200,000
niara) for a detailed siirvey on vegetation, land capability, land use and
7
land classification for irrigation purposes in 1968. From the surveys
and studies, recommendations were made for better inplementations of
available land. In discussing the land systems in East Central States it
is convenient and most appropriate to break it down under the Palm Belt
region and the Scarplands.
The palm belt is remarkable for the open character of its vegetation
and the predominance of the oil palm, which is the most inpoz*tant cash
Ibid, p. 236.
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crop in the region. The uniformity of its terrain, which is almost
coii5)letely devoid of physiographic differentiation is unique, and so is
the fact that parts of this region support a rural population of over
1,0(X) persons per square mile. Palm produce is the basis of the e3q>ort
trade of this region, which was one of the most developed parts of the
country. It makes it possible for large numbers of people to survive in
districts which produce very little food. The entire region is underlain
by one main geological formation, the Coastal Plain Sands, and the soils
8
developed on it are porous, highly leached and us\ially infertile.
The Scarpland region is one of the most documented regions in
Nigeria, but much of the literature is conceived only with areas within
the East Central State, where the main Tipland is identified with the
well known Udi Plateau. This region provides the most varied landscapes
and scenic beauty in Nigeria. Farmland is insufficient for the local
population and many parts of the region are food deficit areas. This is
the main reason why this region exports a considerable percentage of its
adult population to towns and rural areas in other parts of the country.
Land Tenure System—The tenure system in Nigeria vary from state to
state, but in general it is usually communal, that is, vested in family,
village, or tribe. Upon given the right to ownership by the traditional
authorities, the land owner is normally free to use his land however he
wants with the "sole stipulation that he cannot alienate the land, for
exanple through sale, from the community.'' "Thus rights to use are
8
Reuben K. Udo, Geographical Elions of Nigeria (Berkeley, L. A.:
University of California Press, 1970), p. 66.
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customarily held by individuals where as rights to disposal are held by
9
groxqjs*" This point is debatable since the provision does not exist in
certain parts of East Central State^ where land ownership is inherited
in the family who has the traditional right to dispose it which ever way
it is deemed fit, or profitable. The general conception that land belongs
to the community no longer applies to the very densely populated areas
where all land, excepting juju groves, market squares and a few palm groves,
belong to individuals or to families rather than to the village community.
Land acquisition is hereditary, each male child being entitled to a share
of his father's land. This has led to "extreme fragmentation and the
proliferation" of uneconomic holdings.
In cases where land was free but restricted to use ly local
inhabitants, there may have been inpediments to development. The Ibos
who are willing to cultivate mused or mderutilized land are prevented
by such a system from doing so, and since they have to migrate due to
pressure of population upon land, there would be an overall loss in total
10
output. It has been pointed out by FAO that traditional farming methods
and systems of land tenure inhibit an extensive use of land for farming.
This system would continue to inhibit agricultural progress if not
9
Helleiner, Op. Git., p. 56.
10
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nation.
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tackled properly by the state government. Dr. Oluwasanwi in his paper,
made two suggestions on how to tackle the problem. First he suggested
tax imposition on land. Unproductive land owners would have to sell their
land to the state or to move productive farmers. Farmers should pay 6d
(six pennies) per acre per year. "There may be a hue and cry over this
because people are loath to change. But the imposition of land tax will
enhance the productivity of the individual farmers that are left."ll
Secondly, he suggested a cooperative system of farming. Mutual
distrust, jealousy, back-biting and backsliding have impeded the imple¬
mentation of such a venture. This can be achieved through trained
extension workers, and through the elimination of individual small farm
holdings. It is important to increase land under cultivation if agriculture
must provide employment for six million workers by 1974.
Farm Settlement Scheme—Farm Settlement aimed at the development of
settlement villages for new and well-trained agricultural settlers on
land acquired by the government in selected areas throughout the state.
The 1962-68 Development Plan, intended to establish a number of settlements
each accommodating some 720 farmers on about 12,000 acres of land.
The Government Farm Settlement Scheme hoped to attempt to reverse
the trend of migration from rural to urban areas, to absorb some of the
unemployed primary school leavers and to demonstrate to and educate the
people in the possibilities of large scale farming. It aimed at increasing
and maintaining the output of food and agricultural products by making
Oluwasanwi, "Agriculture and Rural Development," paper presented
at the Conference on National Reconstruction and Development at Ibadan
University, 1969.
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niral areas more productive throtigh fuller use of sparsely populated
land.
The settlements were intended to show that fanning could be both a
profitable and an attractive way of life, and it was hoped, they would
encourage yomg men to consider fanning as a way of earning their liveli¬
hood. Each settlement would consist of a village center coiqprising a
school, coinmuni-ty hall, health center, post office, cooperative shops,
12
markets, processing mills for produce etc. ^st of the settlers were
to be primaiy school leavers who could not get into secondary schools.
The plan was to offer than various incentives in order to attract them
to take up fanning as a career.
Twelve farm settlements were planned by the former Eastern Nigeria
Government. Two of these are located in the present East Central State.
One is located at Uzo-Uwani, in Nsukka Division, and the other at
Igbarian, in Onitsha Division. The Igbarian settlement was designed to
settle liOO educated faxmers each of which would be provided with nine
acres of oil palm, five acres of citrus trees and two and a half acres
of arable land to be ploughed with tractors. Each settler also would
have additional half acres of land set aside for vegetables and poultry,
and rice would be grown by communal effort.
In Nsukka Division, the settlement emphasis was on swmp rice, which
is grown under modem methods of irrigation. Individual families in the
10,560 acre settlement would have about sixteen acres of land, ten of which
T2
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were to be planted with rice. Onions are to be planted as a cash crop,
and each settler has the usual two and a half acres for food farm and
half an acre of compoundland for house and garden.
The farm settlement scheme which at one time was thought to be one
of the most useful answers to unemployment is criticized as being both
very expensive and ineffective compared with extensive work in existing
villages, from which the settlements diverted staff. It was estimated
that it would cost between fe2,500 to fe3,000 to settle each farmer. The
estimated net income of each settler was put at about fel50 to fe200 per
annum depending on the type of crop.^^ The failure of demonstration
farms, set up by the Extension Division of the Ministry of Agriculture,
to make an impact on local fairming methods suggests that these settlements
are not likely to have much influence on peasant farming in the various
localities.
Supporting Services for Agriculture—This included:
a) The purchase of equipments primarily for land clearance
in conjunction with the Farm Settlement Scheme.
b) The establishment of a revolving fund for the purchase
of miscellaneous processing machinery such as hydraulic
presses with an extraction efficiency of 92 percent.
This would include cassava graters, rice hullers,
kernel crackers, etc.
13
Udo, op. cit., p. 85.
14udo, op. cit., p. 85.
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c) Agriculture Credit, to make long-term credit available
for the development of farm holdings and to assist
small farmers to make productive investment in
agriculture by providing credit. ^ The fund will also
meet the short-term and medium-term credit needs of
the new settlers in Farm Settlements. )
The system of granting loans was cumbersome with red tape, with the
resultant effect that loans were not granted to the farmers at the right
time. Traditional mon^-lenders have to date provided the bulk of credit
at very high interest rates in the agricultural sector. Such means of
financing rural development in the long run are impracticable. The whole
system of granting loans to farmers sho\xld be changed. It is suggested
that the Marketing Agency could be responsible for making credit facilities
available to farmers. This agency, it is argued, will be more conversant
with the needs of the farmers and will be alive to helping them, and also
it will be easier to collect the loans from the farmers. Since collateral
is often lacking, credit offered in this way, could be tied to the market¬
ing of the crop through the buying agent or co-operative, thus ensuring
a means of repaying the loans. Credit should be given by recognizing the
ability of farmers to repay.
Concl\ision"-Far-reaching changes are seen in the Ministry of Agri-
cvilture and Natural Resources. The development and modernization of
agriculture has been one of the major failures in the East Central States'
reconstruction effort. An advisory committee was set up by 1972 to
formulate a strategy and to advise on the suitability or otherwise of the
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Ministry's institutional structure. Since it is, according to Mr. Asika,
"obvious from past performances that the Ministry cannot profitably
engage in direct production," the farm settlements and institutions such
as the Ezillo, Nekede and Nkwelle Farms and the Abakaliki Poviltry Center
were handed over to the Agricultural Development Corporation "for
operation on commercial principles."
The success of the Development Corporation's cold storage unit at
Enugu, has enco\iraged it to plan for similar units in Aba, Oweri, Umahia,
and Onitsha, The government's dual policy objectives of producing
abundant, and competitively-priced, farm crops and making "satisfying
profits" out of agricultural development are clearly going to depend to
a great extent on the ADC whose performance are obviously watched closely.
CHAPTER III
TRADE AND INDUSTRY
The declaration of seccession on May 3O, 196? by the former Eastern
region, prompted the first strategy by the federal government to use
economic blockade with the hope that it wo\ild bring considerable pressure
on the secessionist to renounce secession. The effects of the economic
blockade have been mentioned earlier in chapter one.
The federal government undertook some measures to assist in raising
resources for the war. In October, 1967, the government raised the rates
of import and excise taxes and introduced a national reconstruction for
change of five percent on tariff rates with the exception of a few
necessary in^jort items. A super tax of 10 percent on company profits in
excess of E^^OOO or a tax of 1$ percent of the issued and paid up share
capital, which ever was larger, was introduced. A compulsory national
savings scheme was introduced which required all wage and salary earners
as well as self-employed people to contribute five percent of their
incomes for one year starting December 1, 1967. These sums were to be
1
refunded with interest in 1977* The import of a few commodities with an
approximate value of fe6l.5 million or 2$ percent of all imports in 1965,
the year prior to the crisis, was restricted.
The prolongation of the war created an adverse economic situation
that necessited further strengthening of economic policy in April 1968,
i
Joseph Okpaku, Nigeria; Dilemma of Nationhood (New York: The Third
Press, 1972), p. 3U2.
31
32
As a result, the import surchange was raised from the five percent to
7.5 percent, affecting all imports. A 10 percent import duty was
imposed on raw materials used in local industry, a category not hitherto
taxed, A 10 percent excise tax was imposed on certain domestic manu¬
factures that were previously tax free. There were further increases on
the excises on beer, soft drinks, and cigarettes. Some items manu¬
factured in Nigeria were placed on specific licenses.
The impact of these measures on the East Central State, coupled
with the destructions of the war created an adverse effect on the trade
and industrial sectors of the economy. There was a rapid increase in
price levels as aggregate demand exceeds supply. The rate of inflation
in war affected areas was quite high, because these areas were the main
centers of fighting, and output and distributive channels were severely
disrupted there. For example, a cup of garri which would have cost
about two to three pennies before 1966, cost 16 pennies during the crisis
indicating a price rise of 400 percent to 700 percent. A yam was said
to be costing two pounds indicating a price rise of close to 2000 percent
from pre-war price.^ Since garri and yams are basic foodstuffs, it can
be surmised the overall rate of inflation must have been very high because of
the predominance of food in determining total consumer costs.
By the end of the war in 1970, the East Central State went through
the process of rebuilding, A sum of felSO million was allocated in the
development plan to re-activate the states* economy. This is an increase
of over fe70 million which was allocated for the 1963-68 development plan
^Ibid. p. 1015.
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by the former Eastern region. Of the felSO million, 150.8 million was
allocated for Public Sector Capital Investment, 15.6 million of which
goes to industry projects. The state government had earmarked nearly
1500,000 for aid to private businessmen and traders. Small scale
Industries in the state will be granted loans totalling 130,000 to help
them get over setbacks caused by the war. Fifty-nine percent of the
funds would be used for reconstruction and development of facilities
istroyed or damaged in the war. About 41 percent will be utilized to
generate new development and create new employment opportunities. Under
the development plan about 119.9 million was specifically allocated for
primary production, trade and industrial sectors. Nearly 11 million was
earmarked as loans to assist in the rehabilitation of private businessmen
and traders.^
To get a vivid overview of the economic development of East Central
State, it is important to discuss at this time the three towns where most
of the tradings take place and the industries are located. Aba, Onitsha
and Enugu township.
The Onitsha Market—Onitsha, before the war, was known all over
Nigeria for its market which was by far the largest and most modem in
the country, if not in West Africa and for the variety of goods obtainable
3
Total of all projects for the Eastern Region, 1108,323 million.
^From a correspondence, "East Central Development Plan," West Africa
(London: No. 2813, April 23, 1971), p. 462.
from this market. The value of goods handled at Onitsha market per annum
was put at about felO million (20 million naira), and only a few people
who visited the market would doubt the veracity of the common saying that
"if there is any merchandise that cannot be found at Onitsha, then that
merchandise cannot be obtained ai^here else in Nigeria,"
The market was built at a cost of about 1060,000 naira (fe530*000)
and occupies 15 acres and a total of 3>26U stalls. Onitsha had in effect
been collecting and distributing center rather than a producer-distributor
and this explains the vast extent of its hinterland which includes such
distant places as Northern Nigeria.
Traders from all parts of Nigeria and the Cameroons congregated at
Onitsha to buy because of the low prices of commodities prior to the war.
This was due to the wide range of goods on sale, and the ease and low
cost of transportation to and from Onitsha. Transportation was enhanced
by the opening of the Niger bridge in January, 1966, The million Niger
bridge was completed in December, 1965 as a toll bridge linking Mid-West
State and East Central State. It was destroyed in September, 196? by
retreating troops of the Biafran regime during the war.
Many people were baffled the fact that Onitsha market offered the
lowest prices for most imported commodities but there are many reasons
for this, one of which is the keen competition in the market. Low prices
are also a result of large scale smuggling which made it possible to sell
high quality goods at about half the shop price since this permitted the
dealer who paid no customs duty to make a considerable profit. The sale
of imitation goods was also another factor which made for the low prices
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at Onitsha market.^ There is no available statistics to indicate the
revenue generated by the market.
The Onitsha market was destroyed during the war, but less than three
years after the end of the war, abundance and variety of goods available
in the rest of Nigeria can also be seen in the greater markets of this East
Central State. Food prices in the states' leading commercial center,
Onitsha, are lower than in Lagos. Vast number of small enterprises florish,
every kind of craftman advertises his services such as watch repairers,
welders, photographers, hairdressers, cabinet makers, tailors, goldsmiths,
do cument copiers.
By November, 1972, traders seemed to flock to Onitsha from many parts
of the federation to sample the stocks of the great wholesalers, who may
often be illiterate women but who know exactly what is wanted, where to
get it and what to charge for it. As of November, 1972, the great central
market, shattered during the war, was still under repair, but when shortage
of money and of cement is finally overcome, there is no chance that it can
accommodate all those whose stalls then constituted the temporary market.
Already, it seems, Onitsha's trade turnover is higher than it has ever
been. It is as though the trading talent which was once so widely spread
throughout the federation is now concentrated here.^
The Market and Industrial Town of Aba—Before the war, Aba was one
of the largest towns in the Eastern states, with a market only second in
^Udo, op. cit., pp. 52-54.
^"Matchet's Diary, from Enugu," West Africa (London: No. 2894,
November 27, 1971), p. 1585.
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size and range of goods to that at Onitsha, Retail traders traveled to
Aba from Ikot Ekpene, l^yo, Oron, Oweri, Uitiuahia, Opobo and Uzuakoli to
buy goods like sugar, cloth, stock-fish and lanterns which many Aba traders
imported directly from the manufacturing countries. Trades in tobacco
and textiles were also sources of economic stability at that period. But
the imposition of higher taxes and the restrictions placed ly the federal
government on import goods during the war brought the market activities
to a stand still.
Since 1950 the development of factory industries was based largely
on local raw material and skill and that had made progress ever since
minus the short interruption which were located in the main industrial
estate which occupies the northern part of the town are the Star Beer
Factory, which produces mineral waters, soap factories belonging to Lever
Brothers and other enterpreneurs, and a pharmaceutical factory for produc¬
ing drugs. There is also a large textile factory which uses cotton from
the northern states. Production was stopped in all these factories during
the war but by middle 1970, the Aba soap factory of Lever Brothers resumed
production, the first manufacturing unit in the area to do so. The factory
7
employs 230 people.
Local palm oil is used in soap-making in this part of the country.
The making of black soap is one of the most widespread village industries
in this area. There are at least four large soap factories at Aba. In
1961, three of these factories produced about 76,000 cases of soap almost
7
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all of which were sold without delay. There is no available information
on the revalue from the sale.
The Enugu Coal Mines—^Nigeria is the only country in West Africa
producing coal at present. There are four coal mines in all. One is the
Okaba in Kwara State in the north and three are in Enugu in the East
Central State. The Okpara mine opened in 1952, the Ekulu mine in 1956
and the Ribadu mine in 1961.
During the decade ending in I960, the total output of Enugu coal
averaged about 614.0,000 tons a year, but production has since declined for
two main reasons. Firstly, there is the problem of the mode of production.
Adit mining has resulted in a decline in productivity in the older work¬
ings, where the coal face has receded from the entrances, thereby increasing
the hauling distance. At the same time, there have been increased labor
costs featuring a considerable rise in wages. Secondly, there is the
handicap created by the location of the mines. Heavy transport costs are
involved in deliverii^ the coal to customers in Lagos and other parts of
the country. For example, in I960 the "pit-head" price was about 50
shillings per ton, the price per ton at Lagos and Ibadan was 110 shillings
and 120 shillings respectively. This situation has contributed
significantly amongst other factors to the tendency for users of coal to
turn to other sources of power.
The mines in Enugu went out of operation in 1967 because of the war.
As soon as the war was over former staff of the Nigerian Coal Corporation
returned to their posts at Enugu but there were no funds and had as its
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first task the "dewatering" of flooded mines. It was not mtil April,
1971 that mining was resumed at Enugu but now the pre-war staff of some
5,000 was reduced to 500,
Coal, was the victim of "market forces." But by the time the 1970-71;
Development Plan was announced in March, 1969> oil production was in fiill
swing and the extent of Nigeria’s domestic supplies of fuel oil and
natural gas was known. Above all the Kainji Dam had been commissioned
towards the end of the war, and it was confidently assured that in time
all Nigeria's power requirements could be met from this source. Heavy
investment in the industry could not be justified and the mines wo\ild
have to be content xmtil new uses for coal could be found to "continue to
operate to meet the present requirements of the railways and other local
users of coal." Moreover, the Electricity Corporation, a major consumer
of coal, turned to other fuels and the Railway Corporation was "gradually
fading out of its steam units and replacing them with more efficient
diesel." By the end of 1972, the production in Enugu began to pick up,
turning out U00,000 tons a year, against some 730,000 in 1965-66 and the
9
demand from the railways is falling.
The coal industry might not be essential to the present Nigerian
economy as a vdiole but it is a vital conponent in the economic development
of the East Central State. This is a labor-intensive operation, which
even now at the low production rate, eirploys over 2,000 men in an area of
acute unemployment and puts the best part of hi million into circulation
9
"Nigeria's Coal Crisis: Two," West Africa (London: No, 2896,
December 11, 1972), p. 1658.
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annually in and aroxjnd a state capital where a swollen public service and
a vast trading community depdnd on an inadequate economy. It is
unthinkable that this industry should be allowed to die.
The Nigerian Coal Corporation in February, 1973 contracted Powell
Duffryn Technical Services, international consultants in mining engineer¬
ing and management to study possible development of markets for Nigerian
coal products. At present, the most iit5)ortant local user in the cement
works at Nkalagu which takes some 90,000 tons annually. Small quantities
go to the Electricity Si;5)ply Authority, particularly to the Ogi River
power station, near Enugu, but this is a "stand-by station." Tnihen it was
operating fully Oji River was taking some 12^,000 tons of coal a year.
Other users incliide small bakers and confectioners. Forty-two thovisand
tons per annum is exported to Ghana railway. There is some prospect of
limited sales to Morocco where Nigerian coal might be mixed with the local
supply. There is also a prospect of supplying coal for mixing at Nigeria's
own tin smelter.
The Role for Private Enterprise—Of the total capital required to
implement the 1970-7li Development Plan, half is expected to come from
private investment. About three quarters of private investment is
expected to come firag ■ or from abroad. In Nigeria today,
industry and mining, which includes oil prodviction are dominated by foreign
companies. For Nigeria to be totally independent, there is a great need
for the control of national resources by the government or Nigerian
nationals, also the percentage contribution of manufacturing and mining
to the economy must increase.
Though in recent years the growth of industry in Nigeria has been
relatively satisfactory, the net gain of much of the ind\xstry is minimal
because the industries have to import not only equipment but raw material,
and also employ a large number of expatriate staff. Currently, about 60
percent of total industrial output is for final consximption. The product¬
ion of more intermediate goods at home will reduce the import dependence
of local industry, increase the value-added and reduce the burden on
foreign exchange. That is to say an industry which, for example, produces
raw material for use by manufacturers of plastics wovild be preferred to
one which manufactured plastics but imported its raw material. Miat
matters now is, not the mere local manufacture of a wide range of products
but the impact that such manufacturing activities could contribute to the
growth of income and employment. This means that intentiediate and
capital goods industries would be preferred to those which merely assemble
imported components or which simply, perhaps, at high cost, substitute a
local product for an imported one.
The total industrial investment allocated to state governments by
the federal government in the 1970-714. Plan, is about hl4.5 million. The
states are expected to encourage private enterprise under the guidelines
of the federal government. In industries of basic and of strategic
importance to the economy the government would take a minimum of 55 percent
of share capital. In other large scale industries where technical
partnership with overseas investors is desirable, the government reserves
the right to take 35 percent of equity holding. Apart from governxaent
participation it is now "a firm policy" that Nigerians mtist have a
defined and effective stake in the ownership and management of each
venture established by foreign capital.
In mid 1971 the federal government made a list of 26 categories of
business which are to be reserved for indigenous business. Also in order
to speed up the Nigerianization of trade and industry, the liberalizing
of credit facilities to local businessmen by the commercial banks and the
barring of foreigners in 22 types of business if there is a fixed capital
of less than i200,000 and indigenous eqiiity participation of less than
i;0 percent.
Concliision—Because of the remarkable commercial recovery in Nigeria’s
war-ravaged East Central State, it is easy to assume that, almost four
years after the end of the war, all is now "normal." There is a trade
turnover at Onitsha, the state’s great emporium on the Niger, is now said
to be bigger than ever before. By "the end of 1972 almost all the industry
in the state is working normally and new industries are being established.
Of the government-owned indxistries which required reactivation. Golden
G-uinea Breweries and the Nigerian Cement Factory have both reached pre-war
capacity and the Aba Textile Mills, the Nigeria Construction and Furniture
Company, the Water Planning Company and the Modem Shoe Industry have been
reactivated. Reconstruction work continues on the Modem Ceramics Industry
and the Niger Steel Factory’s management board is working on.
Industrial reconstmction in the state increased in 1972. This year
11.2 million naira had been made available for various capital projects.
Provision for reconstmction included expansion of the Golden Guinea
Breweries at Uitruahia, the modernization of Aba Textile Mills. Work is
continuing on the rehabilitation of Niger Steel at Enugu, Modern Ceramics
at Umuahia, the Mineral Waters Plant at Onitsha and Nigergas at En\igu.
New industries include new investment in the General Cotton Mills at
Onitsha, completion of the Paints Project at Eni:igu, formal establishment
of the Investment Company and Hotel Project at Enugu, and the Holiday
Resort Center at Oguta.
Public investment in industry had fallen short of expectations. The
main advance had been in rehabilitation of former industries. It had also
been difficult to secure private partnerships. Indications were, however,
that things would rapidly improve.
CHAPTER IV
SOCIAL FACTORS IN THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF EAST CENTRAL STATE
Social factors enter the planning process at several levels. Most
obviously they largely determine the ends of economic developments a
better life, more schools, more hospitals, better housing, more leisure
and less back-breaking work and so forth.
The Role of Education—The economic justification of education should
be rationally confined to establishment of manpower boards that will make
specific estimates for an economy of the manpower needs of the immediate
fut\ire and that link initially training to the immediate needs of the
economy. There is the question of how much education? What kind of
education? Who gets the education and when? In the National Development
Plan, the federal government states
"In the Plan, the highest priority has been given to
agriculture, industry and training of high and
intermediate level manpower. It is realized that
there is only a limited amount of capital which can
at any one moment of time be put into the expansion
of agid-culture and the establishment of new industries.
Much of the expenditure by governments in agriculture
and, to a similar extent, in industry is necessarily
in the form of the recurrent expenditure on ejctension
and advisory seirvices and supervision. In order to
provide extension sei*vices and sxipervision, training
is necessary and education for these activities is
therefore of high priority. This is particularly
true of technical education at various levels; train¬
ing of extension workers, supervisors, foremen,
technicians, administrators and managers. The
extension of primary and secondary education has the
double function of providing the informed electorate
without which a democratic state cannot survive and
of providing a pool of school-leavers for which.
subject to further training^ the future managers,
foremen, administrators and technicians are dravm...."!
The East Central State Government was faced with the greatest problem
in education following the destruction of schools during the war. In the
war-stricken areas children were known not to have attended school for
ailmost two years. The Nsukka University was closed for almost three
years. In 1966 when the Nigerian Crisis started, there were in the East
5,925 primary schools with enrollments of 1,236,872. In secondary grammar
schools there were 68,737 students, 9,093 in teacher training and about
2
1,700 at the University of Nsukka.
TABLE IV
EDUCATION ENROLLMENT IN 1966 FOR THE REGIONS OF NIGERIA
North East West Midwest Lagos
Elementary
Schools 518,86U 1,236,872 7U1,832 38U,877 98,511
Secondary
Schools 17,700 68,737 1;8,114.6 16,272 ll;,088
Teacher
Training 12,687 9,093 3,U10 3,6U7 NA*
University
Output of
Students 83 675 iil9 1U6 10
Source: Federal Office of Statistics, Lagos, 1967. *Not Available.
1
National Development Plan 1962-1968, Op. Cit., p. 187.
2
Joseph Okpaku, Dilgnma of Nationhood (Connecticut: Greenwood
Publishing Company, 1972), p. 325.
In a covintry like Nigeria where great premium is placed on education »
and in pairbicular in the three Eastern states where education had
previously been accorded very top priority, the government, with the
assistance of voluntary agencies both local and foreign, has a heavy task
in ensuring that the years lost due to the war, do not constitute a
permanent draw-back to the students.
Under the East Central Development Plan, 1970-7U announced in April,
1971, 68.7 million was allocated for educational reconstruction and
development. In 1971 and 1972 the goverranent budgeted 625.9 million for
recurrent expenditure. Education was allocated 611 million or 36 percent
3
of the total expenditure, most of which was in grant-in-aid to voluntary
agencies. In his budget speech the head of state, Mr. Asika, stated that,
"We will try to strike an adequate balance between the requirement of
education and the need of other services which government is expected to
provide." In other words, tie size of more education services which the
people of the state will receive will in time be determined largely by
the amount of contribution they will be prepared to make specifically for
education.
Education took the largest slice of 1972-73 budget, accounting for a
total of Ulj..8 million naira (36.7 million naira recurrent and 8.1 capital
expenditure). More than $0 percent of total state revenue on current
account is spent on education; the school board alone swallows up 35
million naira for salaries and other expenses.
3
"East Central State: How Near to Recovery?" West Africa (London:
No. 287U, July 28, 1972), p. 967.
The state takeover of schools had enabled the government to direct
investment where it would do most good. As of June, 1973> the East
Central State has an enrollment of 1,3 million children in state primary
schools and nearly 100,000 in state post-prinmry institutions. This
represents an increase of over 60 percent on the pre-war figures for the
area now constituting the state and accounts for well over a quarter of
li
the total enrollment for the federation.
The state's policies of community government and community ownership
had stimulated underdeveloped areas of the state to action. For example
Nkanu showed a 196 percent increase in post-war school enrollment,
Igbo-Eze 114.6 percent, Ukwa 178 percent. In urban centers too, there were
exceptional increases, 272 percent in Onitsha, 26I4. percent in Aba, 216
percent in Enugu, These increases were due mainly to the post-war urban
explosion, representing what the administrator termed the "dizzy summits
of a major and fundamental transformation in the structure of our society
from predominantly rural society in 1966 to the most highly urbanized and
mobilized society in Nigeria,"
Health—The relationship between the standard of health of people
and their level of productivity has been recognized for some time. In
the health program contained in the 'Ten Year Plan of Development and
Welfare for Nigeria 19U6," the authors of the program stated:
—n
"East Central State: Happy Days Here Again?" West Africa (London:
No. 2915, June U, 1973)> P» 967.
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"Neither would it be rational to attQi5)t to apply
a plan which would call for greater effort on the
part of the people, while many of them are in a
debilitated condition from worn infestations and
endemic and epidemic disease. A healthy body,
reasonably nourished, is essential before further
productive effort can be ea^jected...."5
Economic reasoning by itself would lead to giving priority to preven¬
tive over curative medicine, even though the former is in most cases not
strictly medicine at all but public health, and closer to engineering.
The major preventive measures of health are the provision of pure water
and of sewerage, both essentially engineering problems. In planning for
health therefore, the main question is how curative and preventive services
can be planned so as to provide the maximum return in human welfare from
the limited resources of money and manpower available to the nation.
The state government of East Central earmarked E7 million for health
services under the 1970-7U Development Plan. One of the objectives is
to develop as rapidly as possible opportunities in education, health and
employment and to improve access for all citizens to these opportunities.
The emphasis is on the training of a greatly increased number of doctors
and the expansion of hospital services commensurate with the ability of
the economy to sustain them. The Chief Medical Adviser of the federal
government said that Nigeria must produce about 2,CX)0 doctors annually if
the health services are to be substantially inproved. There should be
one doctor for every 30,000 persons but about only 100 doctors graduate
each year from Ibadan and Lagos Medical Schools.
5
National Development Plan 1962-1968, Op. Git., p. 179.
other projects geared towards health seirvices includej Mental Health,
Tuberculosis Service, Dental Service, Urban Health, Rural Health, School
Health, Malaria control and Health Education. Permanent improvement in
the state's health cannot be acquired by clinical medicine alone. There
must be a steady advance in all factors which contribute towards healthy
life—good water, supplies, housing, sanitation, nutrition and conditions
of work.
Housing—The East Central State Housing Development Authority has
spent more than ^2^0,000 as of September, 1972, since the end of the war,
but about E20 million is needed for future projects in Enugu and Onitsha,
More than 55 percent of the houses in the state had been destroyed in the
war and almost all the remainder had suffered from inadequate maintenance
or minor damage.
In dealing with housing it is necessary to differentiate between the
problems in the rural areas and urban housing problems, as the solutions
are bound to be different. The housing problems in the rural areas do not
need heavy capital investment to resolve them, provided a spirit of
communal service can be generated. With adequate health education,
including instruction in environmental sanitation, proper leadership is
all that is required for the rural community to provide themselves with
healtl^y homes and surro-undings.
The problem in the urban area is, however, more complicated. Rapid
urbanization has given rise to and intensified slimi formation in the cities.
Apart from the qualitative deficiencies, there is also quantitative inadequacy.
In formulating policy on housing account has to be taken on two classes
k9
of people in the urban community. There are the low-income group for whom
the state has a responsibility to provide low-cost houses. The alternative
to this is for workers to demand a wage which might be too high for the
economy to bear. The other group consists of persons with higher incomes
who are also hit by the general housing shortage in urban areas and wish
to btiy their own houses, but require assistance in financing.
The first aim of policy must be to bring down the present high cost
of house building resulting from high land values and cost of building
materials and labor. The greater proportion of building materials are
now produced locally but the prices have tended to soar higher and higher.
Transportation—The development of road transportation in the ECS was
unrivalled in any part of the country. It had the most developed road
network in West Africa and roads converging at Aba were amongst the busiest
roads in the country. There was no doubt that the state of develoimient
of transportation reflected the rapid growth of the economy of this part
of the country prior to the destruction of the roads during the war.
The reconstruction of roads and other infrastructure damaged as a
result of the war poses a problem of great magnitude. A substantial
damage has been done to the road network and large portions of the roads
were dug up, and bridges damaged in the course of retreat by the rebel
forces. In the Development Plan of 1970-7U» ^5 million was allocated to
transportation. Three point six million was used on repairs to the
infrastruct\xre such as roads and bridges. The Niger Bridge require
greater engineering skill to effect repairs.
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By Jme, 1972, the performance in transportation had been less than
the average for all sectors. The road program had made good progress but,
for example, very little actual road mileage had been constructed in the
East Central State. Much progress had been made the Nigerian Railway
Corporation but Nigeria Airways was in financial difficulties. Progress
in Improving airports was also very slow. No progress had been made in
the program for the Nigerian National Shipping Line.
Conclusion—Education is a necessary but not a sufficient condition
for economic or any other kind of development. If jobs are not available,
manpower cannot be put to use. If political interests arbitrarily inter¬
fere with the decision-making processes of public enterprises, a high-level
manpower can be rendered in effective to the detriment of the enterprise.
It is therefore, important to ensure that complementary developments
conducive to the effective use of education and manpower take place else¬
where in the economy and in society at large.
CHAPTER V
RESOURCES FOR DETELOPldENT
Financial Resources for East Central State—There are several
variables which affect the rate and level of economic development that
any economy is capable of achieving. Its physicsd resoxirces potential and
actual, its human resources, and the industry skill and enterprise of its
people are no doubt most important factors. The East Central State is
well endowed in hman and physical resovirces, but in order to be able to
use its manpower to reap these resources, it requires capital. Thus
while capital is not the only determinant of economic development, it is
undoubtedly a vital factor. The rate of capital accumulation and therefore
the rate of savings in the state is not known at the present} this is
because the state is still on a recovery stage since the war and also the
state is a part of a national economy and there are no available statistics.
The East Central Government was left virtually with no funds by the
end of the war. The Biafran currency issued by the seccesionist regime,
and old Nigerian currency deposited with the Central Bank by residents in
the war affected area were not redeemed. To overcome this, the federal
government had to pay 120 to everybody who deposited either old Nigerian
currency or Biafran currency, regardless of the amount they deposited.
The cost to the federal government was about lU million. It was estimated
that well over 1200 million Biafran currency was in circulation but only
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sortie El6 million and some million of old Nigerian notes were handed
1
in.
When the new Nigerian currency was issued, as much as kLO million of
new notes remained unissued because old notes to this amount had not been
presented for redemption. It was presumed that the deficiency was accounted
for by notes in circulation in war areas. There were arguments against
wholesale redemption of Biafran currency, since most of it seemed to have
fallen into the hands of speculators, which is the reason behind the
federal government's decision not to redeem the currency. The great needs
of the East Central State was an increase in the purchasing power to
stimulate economic activities. The federal government therefore, made a
special grant of klO million, in place of a currency exchange, which would
be used by the state to improve and rehabilitate services. In this way
economic activity would be stimulated.
The total grant of some hii million was in a free gift in the form of
a transfer of claims on goods and services from the rest of Nigeria to the
East Central State. On the other hand, if this transfer would stimulate
economic activity in the state, it would not be inflationary if it could
repay itself.
Since the East Central State depended on the federal government for
funds at the end of the war, the financial standing of the federal govern¬
ment was not encouraging. In the two war years 1967-68 and 1968-69
expenditure was kl^U million and kl89 million, although in 1966-67 it was
1
Dateline Africa, "Nigeria; kill Million for East Central State,"
West Africa (London; No. 2765> June 6, 1970), p. 625.
53
il68 million. In 1970 there was an estimated increase in public debt
changes of some fe3.5 millionj but this arose almost entirely from internal
debt. External changes decreased from ^2.8 million to 612.7 million.
Revenue, however, had also fallen dviring the war years. The switch from
import duties to excise duties resulting from import restrictions as stated
earlier, and increased local production had left a deficit. The petroleum
profits tax had obviously fallen heavily. The federal government had to
find another felO million for the new states. Although against a federal
revenue of hl70 million in 1966-67 there was only Bl^O million in 1967-68
and roughly the same figure in 1968-69. In 1969-70 the position was far
worse, since the actual revenue was estimated at under ElOO million against
2
the original estimate of hll5 million.
In order to assist economic growth certain relaxations were made in
import restrictions. These affected chiefly machinery, spare parts, and
agricultural equipment. The surcharge of 7^ percent on imports was reduced
to five percent and there were some improvements in capital and initial
allowance for companies. In addition to the capital allowance grant of
25 percent to companies whose property was damaged as a result of the war,
tax reliefs were given to them in accordance with the amount of damage
th^ have suffered. Super-tax to absorb high profits was retained, as a
way of raising tax "without tangjering with the basic companies income tax."
Indigenous traders who suffered most from the effects of restrictions,
were from time to time given special allocations in foreign exchange.
_
From unsigned correspondent on "Nigeria's Post-War Prospects," West
Africa (London: No. 2759, April 25, 1970), p. U5l.
5U
The State Rehabilitation Coraraission's Manpower Division reported in
1970, that displaced bxxsinessmen of East Central State origin asked for
an 68 million long-term interest-free loan. The IjOU? biisinessmen concerned
include merchants, hoteliers, electrical contractors and clinic proprietors.
3
Nigerian First Progress Report —According to the report, the "growth
rate of the gross domestic product" exceeded "all expectations." This
report on Nigeria's Development Plan for 1970-7U also stated that the
"rosy picture" was largely due to the growth of oil production. The growth
rate of the Nigerian economy was about 9.6 percent in 1970-71 and 12
percent in 1971-72. Although these figures are greater than the plan's
estimates, considering the fact that the price level has been rising
tremendously, they may become nominal rather than real.
From Table V it is visible that trade surplus in the first half of
1972 reached a record 67U.90 million. That is higher (622.85 million)
than the s\arpl\is of 652.07 million for the same period in 1971* Exports,
including re-exports, amounted to 63j5»31 million against 63IJ.76 million
in 1971, an increase of 6.8 percent. The value of imports decreased
slightly by 60.28 million. The increase in the value of exports was due
to continued increase in earnings from crude petroleum. Dviring the period,
Ul.l million tons of oil, valued at 6270.89 million, were exported.
Thirty-four point six million tons valued at 6215.3 million were exported
during the corresponding period of 1971, an increase of 26 percent by
value.
3
Federal Ministry of Economic Development and Reconstruction, Report
from Central Planning Office (Lagos: 1972).
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TABLE V
NIGERIA'S EXTERNAL TRADE (^MILLION)
Exports January June
Non-oil Trade 1971 1971 1972*
Cocoa 71.56 1;0.67 27.67
Groundnuts 12.15 9.U2 3.91
Palm Kemels 12.96 6.1;5 3.59
Palm Oil 1.69 0.97 0.12
Rubber 6.20 3.80 1.98
Raw Cotton 5.55 5.50 0.29
Timber, Logs & Sawn 2.61; 1.1;2 1.52
Tin Metal 12.1;! 7.51; 1;.1;6
Re-exports 6.29 3.12 1;.73
Other 38.71; 53.3U 16.15
Total non-oil 170.19 132.23 61;.1;2
Crude Petroleum U76.52 181.53 270.89
Total Exports 6i;6.71 313.76 335.31
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TABLE V — Continued
jpnports January June
1971 1971 1972*
Food I43.96 20.00 25.06
Beverages & Tobacco 2.23 0.97 1.09
Crtide Materials 10.26 5.61+ 6.08
Mineral Fuels 4.U9 2.66 2.i;9
Oils & Fats 0.36 0.20 0.23
Chemicals 60.96 29.73 26.05
Manufactiu’es Classified
By Material 159.73 77.97 69.73
Machinery & Transport
Eq-uipment 211i.li3 107.12 105.67
Misc. ManuCactural
Articles 35.35 13.55 21.23
Misc. Transactions 7.66 3.86 3.78
Total Imports 539.ii5 261.69 261. la
SoTorce: Federal Office of Statistics, Lagos *Provisional figures
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Oil accounted for 81.7 percent, by value, of total exports in the
first half of 1972, compared with 69.1 percent in 1971. The report
stated that traditional export commodities suffered serious decline both
in vol\Hae and value during the period. Earnings slxunped from £97.6
million in 1971 to E63.3 million in 1972. These commodities together
showed a price decline of about I6 percent and a fall in volume of about
27 percent, resulting in a decline in earnings of E3U.3 million, or 26
percent.
On the private sector, there was an e3q)ected investment of some
EI65 million in 1970-71, but that exceeded 1250 million. The bulk of
this investment had been in incorporated enterprises,* with household
investment playing a relatively minor role. There had been a tremendous
vipsurge" in private economic activity since the beginning of the Develop¬
ment Plan. Existing firms had expanded their capacity and in war-affected
areas private enterprises had been largely rehabilitated while new
business had started.
Domestic product for 1970-71 and 1971-72 substantially exceeds the
four year plan estimates. The percentage contribution of agricultxire has
declined from 53.8 percent in 1966-67 to iA.8 percent in 1971-72. In
both years agricultural exports fell very short of plan estimates,
particularly for groxmdnuts and palm produce.
In 1971-72 oil exports amounted to fe580 million against the estimated
figure of £329.5 million. This produced better total export figure than
the plan estimates. On the other hand, at £14.19.9 million in 1970-71 total
imports exceeded the plan estimate of £330 million by a wide margin of
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fe80,9 million. Imports were estimated at fe530 million as against the
plan figure of £362.9 million, giving a margin of £167.1 million.
In considering the achievement of fast economic growth, capital
formation is the crucial factor. As noted above, the actual rate of
capital formation was increasing faster than the Development Plan's
estimates. Domestic Savings, which formed about 90 percent of the total
savings, accounted for the large increase. The increase in domestic
savings was largely due to the fact that the private sector saved more
than expected. Government expenditure increased faster than estimates,
but the effects of this was overshadowed by the tremendous rise in govern¬
ment revalue, which was brought about by the unexpected increase in oil
revenue.
In August, 1972, the federal government announced the need to raise
£60 million locally to finance reconstruction, rehabilitation and develop¬
ment. There are to be six local loans between 1977 and 1997, and stock
is issued in denominations of £10 or multiples. Table VI shows the
distribution of the loans.
On the aspect of capital formation, moreover, the performance of the
private sector has been relatively better than that of the government.
This is because the government is very consumption oriented. This may
caTise the policy of nationalization and increased direct short run,
considering what may be its contribution to economic growth. But the
policy may be justified through the argument of learning by doing and
that of ' control means ownership.
$9
TABLE VI
LOANS BETWEEN 1977 AND 1997
Amount Interest Time Maturity
1st fil5 million 6% 1/2 yr. Feb. 1997
2nd 5 million % 1/2 yr. Feb. 1978
3rd 10 million 1/2 yr. Feb. 1987
iith 5 million % 1/2 yr. Feb. 1978
5th l5 million 6$ V2 yr. Feb. 1997
6th 10 million ^5^ ]/2 yr. Feb. 1987
Total s60 million
Soxirce: "Record Surplus for Nigeria," West Africa (London: August, 1972),
p. 1092.
Revenue Sharing—In the preceding pages, the Nigerian post-war
prospects have been discussed in a nutshell. To fully realize the impact
of the federal government development plan on the East Central State with
respect to financial resources it is appropriate at this time to discuss
the division of revenue between Nigeria's federal and state governments.
When the new states were created in 1968 it was decided that the
allocations previously made to a region from the central government should
be divided up among the new states in a region as an interim measure.
For example, the allocations from the federal government to the former
Eastern region is now divided up among the East Central, the South East
and the Rivers States. As a further interim measure Chief Dina's
committee was appointed to produce proposals to carry the country through
60
\intll a conQJlete constitutional review was possible*
There had been five previous revenue allocation arrangements in
Nigeria prior to the creation of the 12 states, and all were the work of
outsiders. There were the Hicks, Phillipson, Chick, Raisman and Binns
reports. Chief Dina's committee, the first purely Nigerian boc^ to make
recommendations, criticized the foreigners for "paying too much attention
to political considerations in making their recommendations and too little
U
to more objective factors." The Committee went further and said that
revenue allocation should reflect the concept of "development finance"
for the country as a whole rather than a narrow concept. They stated that
since some of the new states would find it Impossible to finance them¬
selves, some of the functions th^ inherited from the old regions—higher
education, for example, or scientific or industrial research sho\ild revert
to the federation.
The Binns arrangement of 196U, in force at the time of Biafra's
secession, had to be modified when the new states were created. Oil had
played its part in the war and was at the center of any revenue allocation
in Nigeria. Fifty percent of oil revenues went to regions of production
under the Binns arrangement, and the rest to the federation and the
"distributable pool," The Dina Committee recommended that all revenues
from off-shore oil, since these cannot be attributed to any Nigerian state,
should be divided between the federation and all states. It also recommends
that oil rents (not very significant in amount) should go to producing
H
"Vfliat's Happened to Dina?" West Africa (London: November 8, 196?),
p. 1327.
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states, but that of royalties, federally deterrained and collected, only
10 percent, instead of $0 as previously, should go to producing states,
most of the rest going to the distributable pool. The federal government
woxild receive 1$ percent of royalties, 70 percent would be divided among
other states (in contrast to the previous 35 percent put into the
distributable pool) and five percent would be put in a special accomt
from which grants could be made to states.
So all Nigeria and not just the producing states, would benefit
greatly from oil. Since the East Central State is a minor oil producer,
this recommendation would benefit it. The Ibo-speaking areas of the East
(ECS) accounted for only 2,8 percent of Nigeria's total crude petroleum
exports, although boundary areas between the Ibo and Rivers state areas
also accounted for another percent. Exports of crude petroleum from
Nigeria in 1966 amounted to 692 million. Total exports from Ibo areas
just before the war were therefore substantially less than h20 million out
of the Nigerian total of 1283 million. So that the Dina Committee
recommendation wo\ild increase the financial resoTarces of the East Central
State if adopted.
Under the Binns arrangement all produce export duties went to the
state of origin but the Committee recommended that they should be divided
in much the same way as oil revenues. Once again this should benefit the
East Central State since there were no inportant exports from this area.
Of the estimated 125 million worth of agricultural exports from the whole
of the Eastern region before the war, only 19 million came from the ECS.
Exports and the prospects of exports of non-agricult\iral commodities were
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modest. The export of coal produced here was declining and brought in
less thaja 60.1 million just before the war.
At the meeting of the States Finance Commissioners in June, 1969 the
Dina Committee recommendations were rejected. Although the reported reason
for the rejection was not the recommendations themselves, but the fact the
"Committee had gone beyond its term of reference." At this meeting, the
Commissioners from the richer states, those with oil or a substantial
export of produce, were not ready to make concessions of the kind recommended
by the Committee for the poorer states, of which the East Central was one.
Since then, a temporary revenue allocation system, which is much
closer to the Dina recommendations than the old system of division between
the center and the regions, tinder which the federation and the states still
work, has been adopted. The interim arrangement Iter approved, partly
restored the Dina principle of need, though only as represented popu¬
lation and not by differait development levels. It changed the allocation
of the "distributable pool" established originally to take account of the
old region.
Half the pool (into which 30 percent import duties, except those on
tobacco and motor fuel, and 35 percent of mininumi rents and royalties will
be paid) would be divided equally among the states, and half would be
divided among them according to their populations. This would be very
inportant to the East Central State, since it ends the arbitrary arrangement
that a new state would share equally with other new states only those
revenues which accrued to the former region of which it was a part—in the
case of the East Central State, the Eastern region.
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The Dina Committee stated that it has viewed all the sources of
revenue of the country as the common funds of the country to be used
for executing programs which can maintain the unity for which men were
dying.
Marketing Boards—The Export Marketing Boards have been of major
importance to the government prior to and after the war. These boards
have controlled the domestic purchase and the sale on world markets of
major agricultural exports. They are statutory monopsonies which
establish the prices to be paid to peasant producers (or middlemen who purchase
from the producers) on the basis of non-market criteria. Sixty-three
percent of the total exports in 1963 in Nigeria was handled by the
Marketing Boards.
The fiscal role of the Marketing Boards has been termed to be an
extremely effective instrument for the mobilization of savings for
government sponsored economic development. They had, since their birth
in 1939, enormous powers to accumulate and expend funds earned from their
trading operations for development purposes. State governments of the
federation had stated quite explicitly that the Marketing Boards are an
important source of revenues for their development budgets.
In a country which is predominantly agricultural and which has
constantly found it difficult and sometimes impossible to tax effectively
a large proportion of farmers, marketing boards operations are a less
painful means of mobilizing resources Mr. V. A. Oduntan argued that:
^Helleiner, op. cit., p. 152.
"The Marketing Boards monopoly—can operate as
an effective policy instrument for the
mobilization of resources for economic
development. In an economy where the usTial policy
instruments such as interest rates^ taxation,
central banking and monetary measures do not
fTinction very effectively, a new fiscal attitude
to the Marketing Boards should now replace the
traditional view of seeing its operations in
the context of a mere stabilizing agency which,
for purposes of economic tidiness and
organizational structure, should not be
permitted to perform any fiscal functions. It
is more realistic not only to recognize this new
role but also to redesign the policies and
operations of the Marketing Boards with the
deliberate aim of making this fiscal role more
effective and consistent with the desired rate
of economic development...."6
The Marketing Boards have carried a degree of responsibility for
the support of research and development ever since their formation. It
was the intention of the Boards from the beginning to use reserves
accumulated through trading operations for p\irposes other than stabiliza¬
tion
These puiposes did not constitute at that time a first priority
claim upon them instead, only after working capital needs and
stabilization reserves had been provided for was significant consideration
to be given to research and development allocations. After setting aside
the estimated reqiiirements for working capital, the remainder was always
to be allocated, on a produce by product basis, proportionally: 70
percent to be retained for stabilization purposes; 22^ percent for develop¬
ment; 7^ percent to be expended upon research.
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The allocations to development were to be turned over to the
Production Development Boards of the states in tie form of grants for
'the development of the producing industries and the economic benefit
and prosperity of the producers and the areas of production. The size
of the grant to each state board was to be determined by the share which
the state in question had contributed to the total sales of the product
on which the trading surplus had been earned.
Before the war, the former Eastern Region Marketing Board began with
the lowest reserves compared to other regions. This was because it had
the smallest need for them with respect to both working capital require¬
ments and, given with greater stability of palm produce prices and output,
to stabilization reserves. After the war, the East Central State
Marketing Board had to be restructured to cope with the new situation
caused by the poor world prices of palm oil, palm kernels and cocoa.
Since the end of the war, 151,856 tons of palm kernels, 18,112 tons of
palm oil and 2,72U tons of cocoa have been graded in East Central State,
as of October, 1972. The States Produce Marketing Board, once confidently
e:q)ected to make a contribution to capital funds, had to be stibsidized
out of the current revenues to meet the agreed price to be paid to
farmers, because of commodity market conditions and the fall in value of
the pound and dollar in relation to the Nigerian pound. To overcome the
poor world prices, the government is looking to greater utilization of
primary products as raw materials in local manufacturing industries.
Community Councils—These are "kindred groupings" of which six
hundred have been identified in the state. The communities formed in 1972,
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differ enormously in size, some being only a thousand or two. The state
administrator stated the viability of the community councils this way,
"The new covincils, carefully helped l:?y state officers, can do exactly
what they are expected to do. They handled mon^ honestly, because they
have the respect of the people, which the old councils never did, th^
attract free service from the people in a way that no other bodies can,"
In this state, where locally raised revenue is more important than in any
other state of the federation, the councils are tax-collecting authorities,
"They and only th^ can know how rich people are in this situation where
new ways of making money are found every day,"
In order to achieve as great a degree of self-reliance as possible,
particular attention is paid in the budget to in^)roving internal revenue
reso\rrces; the Board responsible for collection is being re-organized
and to ease the burden on taxpayers, facilities for payment by installment
are being extended to the public. The Community Councils, as tax agents,
woxxld retain 20 percent of tax collected for use in local development
projects. New sources of revenue are also to be tapped. The old develop-
7
ment of rates is abolished and replaced 1?y a new scale:
5s for earnings less than hlOO
10s for earnings between £101 and £200
£2 for earnings between £201 and £500
£8 for earnings between £501 and 1000
£20 for earnings between £1000 and £2000
£14.0 for earnings between and over £2000
7
West Africa, Op, Cit,, p, 967.
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Entrepreneurs—The broad definition of entrepreneurs are iiiose who
respond to economic opportunity by taking business risks and who organize
and manage business enterprise. The role of entrepreneurs in economic
development was stated by Schumpeter, the classical economist. He said
that:
"The process of development ca be generated by five
different classes of events: 1) it can arise from
the introduction of a new commodityj 2) it can be
the result of a new method of production] 3) it can
be the consequence of the opening up of a new market]
k) it can be due to the conquest of a new source of
supply of raw materials] or 5) it man emerge because
of a change in the organization of any industry. All
these cases involve a different enployment of the
production factors, and hence by definition, they
constitute development...."8
Since development does not arise spontaneously, it must be actively
promoted by some agency within the system. Schuupeter called the agent
whose function is to introduce new combinations of the factors of product¬
ion an "entrepreneur," and what he creates is known as "enterprise" or
"innovation."
The question now is how the East Central State entrepreneurs (the Ibos)
contribute to the economic development. Ibos were well known for their
mobility and responsiveness to business opportunities. Ibo industrialist
were, according to some studies, likelier than others to be running modem
industries, more their plans for future enterprises were in general
grandiose. As long as the opportunity remained for moving freely throughout
the federation to conduct business, a large number of Ibo entrepreneurs
B
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actively favored intefration. However, after the massacres in October,
1966 which sent about two million Ibo refugees back to their native
lands, these opportunities were seen to be largely denied, regardless of
the institutional frame work.
Ibo entrepreneurs outside of their home region were deeply shocked
and unhappy over the loss of their businesses and property. It was
estimated that at least 50 percent of the Ibos left the north in 1966.
But less than three years after the end of the war, the Ibos demonstrated
their entrepreneural ability in commercial products. By November, 1972,
vast number of small enterprises flourished. All kinds of craftsmanship
sprang tp—watch repairs, welders, photographers, hairdressers, cabinet
makers, tailors, goldsmiths, and document copiers. Onitsha market, the




Findings—The principal factor in the creation of any state, especially
a sovereign one, is the economic viability of the state. The Ibo
leadership in their Eastern Nigerian had this problem in developing Ibo
strategy for secession. A sovereign Ibo state would have siaffered from
severe economic disabilities. As stated in the opening chapter of this
writing, the population density of the Ibo-speaking areas was very high
and Tinder the existing agricultural technology, some parts could not
provide enough food to sustain the population. Iforeover, with the popula¬
tion further swollen by refugees, estimated at about two million, from
Northern Nigeria and other regions, the economic situation had become
even more untenable. The migration of the Ibos to other parts of Nigeria
and foreign countries like the Cameroon Republic, Gabon, and Fernando Po
was the outcome of inadequate resources.
Prior to the war the Eastern region contributed the least of all the
regions to the foreign exchange earnings from other regions. Since
Nigerian governments, like those of most other developing countries
depended largely on foreign trade taxes, the Eastern region was the poorest
region in terns of government revenues inftie days before oil was exported.
The East was then a staunch advocate of the principle of need and
was an opponent of the principle of derivation in the revenue allocation
formula, for Nigeria. Thus in the days before oil, the East under its
Ibo leadership was a strong advocate of a united Nigeria with strong
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powers for the central government. So long as the East had a major
interest in the resources of a federal Nigeria, there was no need to
threaten secession.
The East Central State which is the Ibo-speaking section of the
former Eastern region, did not have in^wrtant exports. Before the war the
Ibo-speaking areas only accoxinted for h9 million out of the estimated
E25 million worth of agricultural exports from the Eastern region, and
their total exports were less than h20 million out of the Nigerian total
of $283 million.
The prospects for indxostrialization in the state were slim. With an
agricultural sector that could hardly meet food needs, there were poor
prospects for supplying agricultural raw materials. The textile mills in
the East Central depend on cotton from the North, Most of the industries
in the state were set up with the anticipated danand of the entire Nigerian
market. These industries would be unviable with the loss of markets
outside the Ibo area, and with adequate export earnings, foreign exchange
would become a major constraint on further industrialization. If the Ibo
state had been successful in its sessation attempt, it would have been
con5)letely landlocked and most probably surrounded by hostile Nigerian
neighbors. Foreign trade, so essential to developing countries in parti-
cxilar, woviLd have been very diffic^llt for the Ibo state.
Conclusion~It is now over three years since the end of the war. The
East Central State is about six years old. The state government has used
whatever economic tools possible to overcome what some termed an inpossible
task, through the process of rehabilitation and resettlement, svibstantial
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investment in education, extensive use of its main economic resources—
land and its people.
As of mid 1973, the economic sitiiation in the state shows a healthy
sign. Revenue raised in the state in the 1973-7U financial year is now
greater than revenue received from the federal government, in great
1
contrast to three years ago. Mr. Asika said:
"To have arrived at a situation in which internal
revenue is greater than federal revenue in only
three years in the post-war circumstances of the
East Central State is truly raaarkable, it is even
more in5)ressive if it is realized that such a
situation is definitely a record in the fiscal
history of the federation and almost certainly a
record in the history of various world federations
created after 19U5*"
The share of total revenue attributed to internal sources had risen
from the dismal 1970-71 proportion to 55 percent in the 1973-7U year.
In 1970-71 the state contributed only 37.8 percent of total revenue and
the federal government the remainder. Recurrent revenue for 1973-71: was
estimated at fe35»9 million, with an increase of h6.25 million in internal
revenue. The recent budget for 1973“7U fiscal year is hl4.1.i:5 million for
recurrent and £28.33 million for capital eaqjenditure. The original
appropriation for 1972-73 was £30.6 million. Then is an over all deficit
on current account of £5.55 million compared to £15.1: million deficit in
1970-71.
The figures continue to show the desperate condition of the state's
finances. Nevertheless, th^ represent on the one had, a welcomed
1
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improvement in the ability to generate revenue internally and on the other
hand the considerably expanded high level of public services—education,
health and welfare, water and utility services—which the state is carrying
and the fortuitous increases in the cost of some of these services and the
irrevocable commitment which the state made in 1972 to repay during the
financial year the conpulsory loan. (The 2$ percent STjrcharge the state
had to borrow from all workers.)
For the state, however, current educational expenditure is its most
valuable capital investment. It takes the largest slice of the year's
budget, accoTinting for a total of £22.U million (£18.35 million recurrent
and £U.05 million capital expenditure) in 1973“7U financial year. More
than 50 percent of the total state revenue on current account is spent on
education.
The two major policies of the administration—community government
and community ownership and control of schools ]|ad stimulated under¬
developed areas of the state to action. This is shown by the increase in
school enrollment due mainly to the post-war urban explosion, representing
the dizzy summits of a major and fundamental transformation in the
structure of the society from predominantly riaral society in 1966 to the
most highly urbanized and mobilized society in Nigeria.
Industrial reconstruction in the state increased in 1972. In 1973-714.,
£5*6 itiilllon had been made available for various capital projects. A
new Marketing Organization properly structured to carry out the remaining
functions on commercial principles is being considered and will be established
shortly. The old Board wovild have Jrithered away. Resettlanent and
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rehabilitation had gone well but there are still the second phase or
reconstruction and the restoration of public utilities and eniployiaent.
Public investment in industry had also fallen short of expectations.
The nifl-in advance had been in rehabilitation of former industries, which
pronpted Asika to state enthusiastically in his budget speech that:
"While some of the wounds of conflict are only too
patently still with us, it is our determination
henceforth to review out situation and requirements
in the context of presait day realities and future
needs. It is our intention to begin to face up to
the ever greater challenge of establishing our place
in the fast developing economy and contributing our
full share to national development...."2
In order for the East Central State government to establish its place
in the fast developing economy, five major policies may achieve the
objective: a) Higher capital formation—investment about 20 percent of
G.D.P. over the planned period, b) Closed economy—restricting importation
in order to conserve foreign exchange and to promote import substitution
at home, c) Lower consmption—restricting consumer expenditure in order
to enlarge the gap for capital formation, d) Local entrepreneurship-
intensifying investment lending and advisory aid to small scale businessmen
in order to encourage higher participation of local entrepreneurs,
e) Direct public investment—encoiaraging more direct public involvement
in the economy in order to enlarge the public sector through nationaliza¬
tion and higher direct public investment.
With these policies in force it would be appropriate to predict that
the East Central State would soon reach the level at which it belonged in





Adelman, Irma, Theories of Economic Growth and Development. California:
Stanford University Press, 1969,
Collins, Robert, Nigeria in Conflict, London; Seeker and Warburg, 1970.
Helleiner, Gerald K», Feasant Agriculture, Government and Economic Growth
in Nigeria, Homewood, Illinois; Richard Irwin, Inc., 1966.
Richer and Liedholm, Growth and Development of the Nigerian Economy.
Michigan; Michigan State Universi-ty Press, 1970.
Meier, Gerald M., Leading Issues in Economic Development. Stvidies in
International Poverty, Oxford University Press, 1970.
Melson, Robert, Volpe, Howard, eds. Nigeria; Modernization and the Politics
of Communalism. Michigan; Michigan State University Press, 1971.
Niven, Sir Rex, The War of Nigerian Unity 1967-1970. New Jersey; Rowan
and Littlefield, 1971.
Oyinbo, John, Nigeria; Crisis and Beyond, London; Charles Knight and
Company, Ltd., 1971.
Okpaku, Joseph, Nigeria; Dilennaa of Nationhood, New York; The Third
Press, 1972.
Onitiri, H. M., Ayida, A., eds. Reconstruction and Development in Nigeria.
London; Oxford University Press, 1971.
Udo, Reuben K., Geographical Regions of Nigeria, Los Angeles; IMiversity
of California Press, 1970
ARTICLES AND PUBLICATIONS;
Asika, A,, Reconstniction and Resettlement, Reconstruction and Development,




West Africa, London, 1968-1973*
National Development Plan 1962-1968. Federal Ministry of Economic Develop¬
ment, Nigerian National Press, Ltd, 1970.
Central Planning Office, Federal Ministry of Economic Development and
Reconstruction, Lagos, 1972.
